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the government as are placed upon the private employer. See Borchard,
"Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale L. J. 129 (1924). Such a
tendency is already marked in the field of Workmen's Compensation
wherein employees of state and municipal units are afforded protection
against accident. The expected result is that the double standard implicit
in the ancient concept of immunity of government has become increas-
ingly untenable. In the words of Judge Wanamaker contained in Fow-
ler v. City of Cleveland, IOO Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (i919): "The
whole doctrine of immunity given to a sovereign state was based upon
the assumption of the divine right of kings-a king can do no wrong,
he is infallible, or, if he do wrong, no subject has any right to complain.
This doctrine has been shot to death on so many different battlefields
that it would seem utter folly now to resurrect it, even by the judgment
of a court of last resort."
ROBERT G. ROSENBERG
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
RECOVERY BY DRAWEE BANK OF PAYMENT ON A CHECK WITH
FORGED INDORSEMENTS
Defendant bank, a purchaser for value, indorsed guaranting prior
restrictive indorsements and received payment of a check drawn by the
plaintiff on itself payable to four payees. The indorsements of three of
the payees were forged by the fourth. The plaintiff brought an action
for the recovery of the money paid out on the check. Held: the plaintiff
may recover unless precluded because of waiver, estoppel, or laches on its
part. Whether recovery is barred is a jury question. State Planters Bank
& Trust Co. of Richmond, Va. v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. of
Cincinnati, 56 Ohio App. 309, IO N.E. (2d) 935 (1937)-
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was passed by the Ohio
legislature in 1902. Only a few of the many questions which may arise
under the act have been passed on by our appellate courts. Heretofore
there has been no direct adjudication by any Ohio appellate court on
the question of the right to the recovery of payment by the drawee on
an instrument with a forged indorsement although the question arose in
the Provident Savings Bank v. The Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 43
Ohio App. 533, 183 N.E. 885 (1932). In that case it was unnecessary
to directly pass on the question as the drawee was held unable to recover
on other grounds.
It is well established that the drawee bank may recover the money
paid out to one whose title is dependent on a forged indorsement. Levy
v. First National Bank, 27 Neb. 557, 43 N.W. 354 (1889); First
National Bank of Minneapolis v. City National Bank of Holyoke, 182
Mass. 13o, 65 N.E. 24, 94 Am. St. Rep. 637 (1902); The First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago v. The Northwestern National Bank of Chicago,
152 Ill. 296, 38 N.E. 739, 43 Am. St. Rep. 247, 26 L.R.A. 289
(1894); First National Bank in Miles City v. Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, 88 Mont. 589, 294 Pac. 1105 (193); Cosmopolitan
State Bank v. Lake Shore Trust & Savings Bank, 343 Ill. 347, 175
N.E. 583 (1931). Recovery is based on either of two theories. (i)
The mere presentment for payment is at common law an implied war-
ranty upon which recovery may be predicated. Insurance Co. of North
A1merica v. Fourth National Bank of Atlanta, 12 Fed. (2d) IOO ( 1926) ;
First National Bank in Miles City. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapo-
lis, supra. (2) Money paid out under a mistake of fact may be recov-
ered. State v. Broadway National Bank, 153 Tenn. 113, 282 S.W.
194 (1926); Farmers' National Bank of Augusta v. Farmers' &
Traders' Bank of Maysville, 159 Ky. 141, 166 S.W. 986 (1914).
That the drawee in the principal case was also the drawer does not pre-
clude recovery. American Express Co. v. Peoples' Say. Bank, 192 Iowa
366, 181 NAy. 701 (1921); Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmers'
State Bank of Brookport, 148 Ark. 599, 231 S.W. 7 (1921);
State v. Broadway Nat. Bank, supra. Little support can be found under
the Negotiable Instruments Law for allowing such recovery. Section 66
is not applicable even though the instrument is indorsed on presentment
to the drawee. That section expressly states that the warranty created
accrues to the benefit of a holder in due course. There is no negotia-
tion by presenting an instrument for payment. The drawee meets its
obligation by making payment. It does not purchase the instrument.
The drawee does not become a holder in due course. Brannan on Ne-
gotiable Instruments, 5 th edition, p. 748; Figures v. Fly et al., 137
Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917); Wells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy et al., 214 Cal. 156, 4 Pac. (2d) 781
(93); Nat. Bank of Commerce of Lincoln v. Farmers' & Mer-
chants' Bank of Lincoln, 87 Neb. 841, 128 N.W. 522 (1910).
Under the doctrine of Price v Neal, 3 Burt. 1354 (1762), of which
section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is a legislative qualifica-
tion, the drawee is bound to know the signature of the drawer. It may
not recover payment because of a mistaken belief in the validity of the
signature of the drawer. As to the validity of the drawer's signature
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it acts at its peril. This does not place too great a burden upon the
drawee for it is in a better position to determine such validity than is a
stranger who purchases the instrument after it has passed through many
hands. The drawee bank has on file a signature of the drawer of the
check with which it may make comparisons. But as to determining the
validity of the indorsers' signatures such is not the case. The drawee
has no device to aid it short of contacting all of the supposed indorsers.
Such an additional burden placed on the drawee would greatly impede
the use of checks as the drawee would be incurring a great risk every
time it honored an indorsed check. The drawee, as was pointed out in
the principal case, is not bound to know the signatures of the indorsers.
It does not, by making payment, warrant the validity of the indorse-
ments. First Nat. Bank in Miles City v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minne-
apolis, supra; Nat. Bank of Commerce v. First Nat. Bank of Coweta,
51 Okla. 787, 152 Pac. 596, L.R.A. 1916 E p. 537 (1919); 29 Ohio
Jur. io6o.
The indorsement of the defendant in the principal case guaranteed
prior restrictive indorsements but there were no such indorsements. Had
the indorsements guaranteed all prior indorsements the presenter would
have been liable on that contract. Fallick et al. v. dmalgamated Bank
of New York et al., 232 App. Div. 127, 249 N.Y.S. 238 (I93I);
Real Estate-Land Title and Trust Co. v. United Sec. Trust Co., 303
Pa. 273, 154 At. 593 (193); District Nat. Bank of Washington,
D. C., v. Washington Loan & Trust Co., 65 Fed. (2d) 831 (1933).
For such indorsement is a contract of guaranty even though there is no
negotiation to the drawee.
The court in the principal case referred to one in the position of the
defendant as a holder. Section 191 states that "a 'holder' means the
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer
thereof." From this it can be seen that one claiming under a forged
indorsement cannot qualify as a holder.
The holding in the instant case is on firm ground both in principle
and in precedent.
JEROME H. BROOKS
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